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Abstract
Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bar 
gaining especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently
Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder
independent commitments result in more balanced payos To limit the
scope of possible bargaining results we try to rule out certain bargaining
rules In our indirect evolutionary analysis we rst determine the solution
for all possible rule constellations and then derive the evolutionary stable
rules of bargaining It is shown that ultimatum bargaining requires con 
siderable but non maximal uncertainty about the size of the pie ie the
monetary amount to be distributed
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  Introduction
According to its non cooperative approach bargaining theory should model the
bargaining process as a strategic game and then determine rational bargaining
behavior by selecting among the equilibria  in case there exists a multiplicity of
equilibria Nash 	 Famous examples are Nash
s own model of simultaneous
commitments which usually has many equilibria of which one can select one
by applying the Nash  bargaining solution or the alternating oer model
St
 
ahl  Krelle  and  more elegantly Rubinstein  with a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium	
The wide variety of bargaining rules is troublesome since dierent bargaining
rules usually imply widely dierent outcomes	 In ultimatum bargaining where
one party can confront the other with a take it or leave it  oer the proposer for
instance acquires essentially all the reward whereas simultaneous commitments
as modelled and analyzed by Nash  result in more balanced payos	 To
limit this troublesome variety of bargaining outcomes we apply the indirect evo 
lutionary approach allowing to derive the evolutionarily stable bargaining rules	
To demonstrate how this can be done we rely on a simple bargaining situation in
which parties can try to preempt the other or to restrain themselves	 Preemption
however means to risk conict since one has to commit one
s own demand before
the random choice of the pie i	e	 of the total monetary reward	 In the tradition of
the indirect evolutionary approach Gth and Yaari  we rst determine
the solution of all possible constellations of such timing dispositions and then
derive the evolutionarily disposition  preemption aiming at ultimatumbargaining
or retention aiming at independent commitments
The literature on endogenous timing of decisions see for instance van
Damme and Hurkens  and the references there especially Spencer and Bran 
der  and  with a dierent subgame structure  Sadanand and Sadanand
 can be seen as an alternative method of limiting the wide scope of possible

bargaining rules and outcomes	 Here the selection of bargaining rules is not gov 
erned by evolutionary pressure but part of the strategic calculus of the interacting
parties themselves	 One therefore needs an overall game model capturing the rule
choices as well as the behavioral choices for all possible rule constellations	 An ad 
vantage of the indirect evolutionary approach is that one does not have to specify
such an overall game model	 Actually none of the parties involved needs to know
how evolutionary forces select among bargaining rules	 Furthermore the indirect
evolutionary approach usually implies dierent results even when the structural
relationships are known see Dufwenberg and Gth 	
In section  we introduce our simple bargaining environment	 Section  is devoted
to solving all possible bargaining games and section  to the discussion of the
evolutionarily stable constellations	 In section  we summarize our results and
indicate some possible lines of generalizing them	
 The bargaining situation
Let us denote the two bargaining parties as player  and 	 Each party i     
can develop as two types  genotypes in evolutionary terminology	 A U  type tries
to confront the other party with an ultimatum oer whereas an I type prefers to
wait	 Accordingly there are three possibilities of behavioral dispositions m
i
with
 m
i
  fU  Ig for i     
In case of m
 
 m

   I  I both parties i      determine simultaneously their
demand d
i
  after the random choice of the pie c i	e	 the total monetary reward
which can be distributed among the two parties	 If the available total reward c
satises d
 
d

 c each party i      receives d
i
whereas  payos result in case
of con ict i	e	 for d
 
 d

 c	
If m
 
 m

   U U i	e	 if both parties try to preempt the other the demands
d
i
must be chosen before the realization of the stochastic variable c	 Of course

no party then can actually preempt the other since both parties determine their
demand early and thus independently	
In case of m
 
 m

   U  I or I  U the U  type party can confront the other
party with a take it or leave it  proposal d
U
which the other I party can only
accept or reject the latter implying  payos for both	 Here it is important that
the U  type must commit itself before c is randomly selected i	e	 a high demand
may imply conict	
 
time
random choice of c
U  commit
ment time
I  commit
ment time
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Figure  The timing structure of a U   and I  disposition as related to the
random choice of c	
In gure  the timing structure is graphically visualized	 Bargaining parties only
play sequentially in case of asymmetric timing dispositions with the U  type pre 
empting the I type but risking conict since the U  type must commit itself before
c is randomly selected	
Whenever the timing dispositions are the same parties must commit themselves
independently	 In case of U  types this is done before the random choice of c what
will result in conict when demands are positive and the pie c is too small	 If
both parties are of the I types conict can be avoided since the pie c is commonly
known when parties commit themselves independently	
We rst consider the simple case where c      is uniformly distributed on   
what is commonly known	 In general let both parties be risk neutral i	e	 the
positive marginal utilities for money are constant	 Thus for both parties the
cardinal utility is measured by the respective expected monetary payo	
Only in case of m
 
 m

   I  I we will confront an essential non uniqueness of
equilibrium behavior	 By imposing symmetry invariance and eciency we will
then select a unique bargaining outcome similar to Nash  and 	 For
the other m
 
 m

 constellations no selection among equilibria is needed	

 Solution behavior
Let us start with m
 
 m

   I  I when both parties i      determine their
demand d
i
  after the random choice of c i	e	 when choosing d
i
party i     
knows c	 The are many equilibrium demand vectors d
 
  d

 namely all vectors
d
 
  d

 with d
 
 d

  c and d
 
  d

  but also d
 
  c   d

	 Clearly eciency
requires
 d
 
 d

  c for all c      
Eciency and symmetry invariance together therefore imply demands d

i
c
such that
 d

i
c   c for all c      
The obvious advantage of m
 
 m

   I  I is that conict is always avoided since
the expected payos of both parties i      are
 u
i
I  I  
 
R

c

dc  
 

for i     
Since the solutions for the U U  and the U  I constellations will be shown to
resemble the well known duopoly market equilibria of Cournot  and von
Stackelberg  respectively one may wonder about the duopoly market in 
terpretation of the I  I constellation	 Due to the eciency requirement the
I  I result resembles the optimal exploitation of customers on the market i	e	
the two sellers jointly engage in perfect price discrimination and  by the symme 
try requirement  share their revenues equally	 For the normalized linear demand
function with a prohibitive price and a satiation level of  perfect price discrimi 
nation of all customers yields revenues of  thus each seller receives 	 as the
two bargaining parties in case of the I  I constellation	
In case of m
 
 m

   U U demands d
i
with i      are chosen before the
random choice of c	 For a given demand vector d
 
  d

 party i
s expected payo
u
i
is thus

 u
i
d
 
  d

  
 
R
d
 
d

d
i
dc   d
i
 d
 
 d

 for i     
From the necessary and sucient condition for a maximum of u
i
d
 
  d

 with
respect to d
i
for i      one obtains
  d

 
 d


       d


 d

 
and thus the well known duopoly solution Cournot 
 d

i
  
 for i     
resulting in
 u
i
d

 
  d


    for i     
We now turn to the nal case of one U   and one I type where  without loss of
generality  we can analyze only m
 
 m

   U  I	 Party  the U  type must
commit itself to a demand d
 
before c is randomly determined	 But when deciding
whether to accept or reject d
 
 party   the I type  knows the realization of
c i	e	 party  responds to the ultimatum d
 
after the random choice of c	 Thus
party  only accepts d
 
if c  d
 
and rejects d
 
otherwise	 Consequently party

s expected payo is
 u
 
d
 
  
 
R
d
 
d
 
dc   d
 
  d
 
 
Thus the optimal ultimatum proposal is the demand
 d

 
  
The resulting expected payos are
 u
 
d

 
   	 and

 u


 
 
R
  
c  dc    
similar to the well known sequential duopoly solution von Stackelberg 	
With these results we have determined the expected payos u
i
for both parties i
and all possible m
 
 m

 constellations withm
i
  fU  Ig for i     	 In the termi 
nology of the indirect evolutionary approach this means that we have completed
its rst step what allows us to dene an evolutionary game with reproductive
successes u
i
and types m
i
  fU  Ig for the two interacting parties i     	
 Evolutionary analysis
The evolutionary game with reproductive success u
i
and mutants m
i
  fU  Ig
for i      is determined by the results of section  where we have derived the
expected payos u
i
for all constellations m
 
 m

 with m
i
  fU  Ig for i     	
m

U I
m
 
U
 

 
 

 

 
 

I
 

 
 

 

 
 

Table  The evolutionary game in bimatrix form
Table  represents the evolutionary game in bimatrix form with entries u
 
  u

	
Whereas m
i
  I achieves a higher expected payo than m
i
  U when the other
party is of the U  type the same payo is achieved when the other party is of the
I type	 We thus have proved
Proposition  For the bargaining situation described in section  there exists
only one evolutionarily stable bargaining disposition namely the I type	

Proof In the table m
i
  I weakly dominates m
i
  U what proves that the
bimatrix game has a unique evolutionarily stable m
i
 type in the sense of an
evolutionarily stable strategy namely m
i
  I for i      due to
	   u
 
I  I   u
 
U  I  

	
and
   u
 
I  U  u
 
U U   
In the long run both parties will thus be of the I type i	e	 the bargaining rule will
be the one of simultaneous commitments after the random choice of c	 Neither
early simultaneous commitments nor the ultimatum rule are evolutionarily stable
since the nal population must be I monomorphic Finally since both parties
wait for the random choice of c before they commit themselves and thereby avoid
conict and always distribute the whole pie c the only ecient constellation of
timing dispositions is evolutionarily stable	
In view of endogenous timing Table  would not describe an evolutionary game
but the truncation of an overall game where later subgames are substituted by the
solution payos as determined in section  see for instance Table  of Spencer
and Brander  p	 	 Such an overall game would have to assume that
parties i      strategically choose their timing disposition m
i
  fU  Ig before
the U  commitment time in the gure above	 In general it will matter whether
such strategic choices of m
i
are made independently or sequentially and what the
parties know about each other but since m
i
  I weakly dominates m
i
  U for
the case at hand such details do not matter	 Thus our analysis can also be viewed
as a study of endogenous timing in bargaining situations see the more or less
related results of Spencer and Brander  as well as Sadanand and Sadanand
	

 Reducing the degree of uncertainty
Since in Table  one earns the same expected prot as an m
i
  U or an m
i
  I 
type when the other party is of the I type Proposition  could describe a rather
special result	 On the other hand a similar analysis for general densities on   
is rather dicult see Appendix	 When analysing how the degree of uncertainty
inuences the result we therefore rely on a special class of densities namely the
uniform densities on
 
 

  
 

 

with    
 

	 Our previous result refers to
the special case of   
 

	 Compared to this boundary case positive parameters
 
 

express more certain expectations i	e	 less uncertainty regarding the size
of the pie	
Proceeding as for   
 

one obtains the following results
In case of m
 
 m

   I  I the result does not change since for all parameters
 with    
 

the expected pie is
 

	 Thus one obtains d

i
c   c and
u
i
I  I  
 

for i     	
In case of m
 
 m

   U U one obtains
 d

i
 

 




for
 

  
 
 
 




for
 
 
   
and
 u
i
d

 
  d


  


 


 




for
 

  
 
 
 




for
 
 
   
for i     	
Finally the result for m
 
 m

   U  I is described by d


c   c  d
 
if c  d
 
as well as by
 d

 
 

 




for
 

  
 

 

  for
 

   

yielding
 u
 
d

 
  


 


 




for
 

  
 

 

  for
 

   
and
 u


 


 


 




for
 

  
 

 for
 

   

One easily can check our former results by setting   
 

	 The limiting case of no
uncertainty at all i	e	     yields the evolutionary game of Table  with the
only equilibrium U U in strictly dominant strategies	
m

U I
m
 
U
 

 
 

 

  
I  
 

 

 
 

Table  The special case of certainty    
For parameters  with
 

  
 

the corresponding evolutionary game is described
by
m

U I
m
 
U

 


 




 

 


 




 


 





 
 


 


 




I
 


 


 




 
 


 





 

 
 

Table  The case of uncertainty with
 

  
 


Notice that for
 

  
 

one always has

 


 






 

 







as well as

 


 

 


 
 

what proves that U  I and I  U are strict equilibria	
For      the evolutionary game is given by Table 	
m

U I
m
 
U
 




 
 




 

   
I  
 

 
 

 
 

Table  The case of uncertainty with     
Since U strictly dominates I due to    only m

 
 m


   U U is evolu 
tionarily stable	
For the remaining case      the evolutionary game is described by
Table 	 Here the result depends on
m

U I
m
 
U

 


 




 

 


 




 

   
I  
 

 
 

 
 


Table  The case of uncertainty with     
whether


 






  
holds or not	 Now inequality  is equivalent to



 



 
p


 
Thus Table  has a unique solution in dominating strategies namely m

 
 m


  
U U for

 
p


    
and two strict equilibria namely m

 
 m


   U  I and m

 
 m


   I  U for

 

  
 
p



In case of two strict equilibria and an additional equilibrium in completely mixed
strategies the interpretation and implications of evolutionary stability could de 
pend on whether one assumes a single population model both players  and 
are drawn from the same large population and randomly matched or relies on
two populations each player i      is drawn from his own large population and
randomly matched with a partner randomly drawn from the other population	
Here we do not want to exclude the evolutionary stability of the two asymmet 
ric strict equilibria U  I and I  U by imposing the one population model	 In
evolutionary terminology this means that there exist two species one represent 
ing player  and the other representing player 	 Given this interpretation our
previous results imply
Proposition  For the bargaining situation described in section  the evolu 
tionarily stable timing dispositions m

i
  fU  Ig for i      depend on the
degree of pie uncertainty as follows

i In case of small uncertainty

   
 
p



the only stable timing disposi 
tions are those of the monomorphic constellation m

 
 m


   U U	
ii In case of greater uncertainty

 
p


  
 


only the two bimorphic timing
dispositions m

 
 m


   U  I and m

 
 m


   I  U are stable i	e	 the rules
of bargaining are those of ultimatum bargaining	
iii Only if uncertainty is maximal

  
 


the unique stable constellation is the
monomorphic constellation m

 
 m


   I  I	
Proof According to Table  for     as well as Tables  and  for   
the evolutionary game has a unique equilibrium in dominating strategies
m

i
  U if  
 
p


what proves i	 For part ii the evolutionary game
has two strict equilibria due to  and  respectively  namely
m

 
 m


   U  I and m

 
 m


   I  U and a completely mixed strategy
equilibrium which by denition is non strict	 Clearly both m
i
  U and
m
i
  I are alternative best replies against this mixed equilibrium strategy	
If now the mixed equilibrium strategy population of one player is gradu 
ally invaded by either the U   or the I mutant this would bring about an
evolutionary advantage of the I  respectively the U  type of the other pop 
ulation as compared to the mixed equilibrium strategy	 Thus according to
the two population interpretation the mixed equilibrium strategy is evolu 
tionarily unstable whereas there exist no alternative best replies for the two
strict equilibria U  I and I  U	 This proves that only m

 
 m


   U  I
and m

 
 m


   I  U are evolutionarily stable	 Part iii simply restates
Proposition 	
In view of Proposition  ultimatumbargaining see Gth  and Gth Schmitt 
berger and Schwarze  for the rst experimental analysis requires essential
but non maximal pie uncertainty	 Here one however should keep in mind that
our analysis has been restricted to the class of uniform distributions	 There is no
loss of generality in assuming c      since the pie must be non negative and
since one can set the maximal possible pie for all possible distributions with nite
carrier equal to 	 But one can induce evenmore pie uncertainty than in case of the
uniform density with   
 

by allowing for non uniform densities	 Clearly more
pie uncertainty in this sense will render general retention i	e	 m

 
 m


   I  I
a generic result and not simply one of a border case

  
 


	

 Final remarks
One potential of the indirect evolutionary approach is that it allows to derive the
evolutionarily stable rules of the game which are usually exogenously imposed	
We have accomplished the rst step of indirect evolution by requiring rationality
in the form of subgame perfect or ecient and symmetry invariant equilibrium
behavior	
For the second step  the determination of the evolutionarily stable m
i
 types 
we have imposed no essential restriction	 Most reasonable learning cultural or
genetical evolution dynamics and all static concepts of evolutionary stability see
Hammerstein and Selten  as well as Weibull  for surveys imply that
the constellations as described by Propositions  and  are evolutionarily stable	
One may add that in view of the indirect evolutionary perspective a multi 
plicity of stable timing congurations is not troublesome What nally results
may depend on initial conditions	 Since in view of endogenous timing such an
ambiguity is more troublesome one may want to resolve players
 strategic uncer 
tainty by applying the theory of equilibrium selection e	g	 Harsanyi and Selten
	 In case of part ii of Proposition  symmetry implies the completelymixed
strategy equilibrium of the truncation i	e	 all four m
 
 m

 constellations with
m
i
  fU  Ig for i      would result with positive probability	
The study demonstrates how one easily can derive the dynamic process of bar 
gaining which usually has to be exogenously imposed and for which there exist
many possible specications with widely varying implications for the bargaining
outcome	 Earlier applications of the indirect evolutionary approach have usually
concentrated on the evolution of preferences e	g	 Gth and Yaari  Gth
and Kliemt  Bester and Gth forthcoming or on the evolution of beliefs
Gth  and not on the extensive form of the game	
To illustrate how the dynamic process of bargaining can be derived we have
relied on simplifying assumptions like uniform densities governing the random

choice of c	 Except for computational diculties one can easily generalize our
analysis	 The optimality conditions for more general distributions are derived and
discussed in the Appendix which in the cases U U and I  I do not allow an
easy computation of the prot expectations and thus of the evolutionary bimatrix
game	
One may worry more specically about the result in Proposition  since according
to Table  the timing disposition I is only weakly dominant	 Would the I type
become strictly dominant if one allows for larger variances than the one implied by
  
 

 There are various possibilities to explore this question e	g	 by assuming
uniform densities on the intervals
 
 
 

 

and
 
 

   

for    
 

	 Another
possibility see gure  are linear densities f c on    of the form f c  
  	c for   c 
 

and f c    	c for
 

 c   where     	
Both versions contain the situation in Proposition  as the special case    	
And the variance of c will be larger than the one assumed by Proposition  if  is
positive	 We leave it to the reader to answer the question above for such specic
densities	
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  
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Figure  Linear densities f c       	c for   c 
 

and f c  
    	

c
 


allowing for larger variances in case of      than the
uniform density on   	
A further assumption is that timing dispositions are commonly known see Gth
and Kliemt  for an indirect evolutionary analysis with incomplete informa 
tion and van Damme  for an endogeneous timing analysis based on our

model which assumes that timing and demand decisions are made simultane 
ously	
Here our aim has been to demonstrate the following message in the simplest way
Dear Reader if you are troubled by the multiplicity of possible bargaining rules
and its resulting multiplicity of possible bargaining outcomes you can derive
the evolutionarily stable bargaining rules and thus limit the scope of possible
bargaining outcomes by applying the indirect evolutionary approach
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Appendix Optimality conditions for densities f c on    with f c   F

c  
F

c
For I  I one has d

i
c   c and therefore by integration by parts
U

i
 
 
Z

c

f c dc  



cF c j
 

F c j
 


 


  F   F  
For U U the payo function of party  is
U
 
d
 
  d

   d
 
 
Z
d
 
d

f c dc
so that

d
 
U
 
d
 
  d

  
 
Z
d
 
d

f c dc  d
 
f d
 
 d

   
If


d

 
U
 
d
 
  d

   f d
 
 d

 d
 
f

d
 
 d

   
one obtains by symmetry
 
Z
d
f c dc   df d

   F d

  d

f d

 for d

  d

 
  d


as an implicit equation for the solution d

  d

 
  d


in case of U U 
Similarly for I  U one has
U
 
d
 
   d
 
c
Z
d
 
f c dc
so that
U

 
d
 
  
 
Z
d
 
f c dc  d
 
f d
 
   
Provided that
U

 
d
 
   f d
 
 d
 
f

d
 
  
one thus has
   F d

 
  d

 
f d

 

as an implicit formula for the solution d

 
in case of U  I	
Since in the two latter cases U U and U  I the optimal decision d

i
are only
dened by implicit formulae an explicit equation for U
i
d

 
  d


 in case of U U
and of U
 
d

 
 as well as

U

 
 
Z
d
 
 
c d

 
 f c dc
in case of U  I is not readily available	
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